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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This paper investigates a dark side of long-term Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) 
relationship - supply chain trust - using primary survey data. Focusing on distributor-manufacturer 
relationships and based on the theory of psychological contracts, this study outlines how 
psychological contract violations result in lower distributor trust in the manufacturer in 
collaborative VMI relationships. Given the need for interdisciplinary research in supply chain 
management (Zacharia et al. 2014), this study is an initial effort to investigate cognitive and 
psychological aspects of buyer-supplier relationships. 
 Design/methodology/approach: Cross-sectional data were collected using a survey format from 
200 distributors which have their inventories managed by manufacturers through VMI 
arrangements. The sample was obtained from a leading third party VMI platform service provider 
that serves thousands of retailer, distributor and manufacturer locations with millions of SKUs and 
billions of dollars in sales orders. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression has been used to test 
the hypotheses and Baron and Kenny (1986) approach of three-step mediation model has been 
utilized to test the mediating role of psychological contract violation. 
Findings:  This paper empirically demonstrates a dark side of highly collaborative supply chain 
relationships in a VMI context: longer VMI relationships are associated with higher levels of 
psychological contract violation, which in turn leads to lower levels of distributor trust. Also does 
it make a theoretical contribution by showing the mediating role of psychological contract 
violation between length of a VMI relationship and supply chain trust. 
Practical implications: Manufacturers should not let the implementation of VMI restrict 
communications with their distributors. Reciprocal inter-organizational communication is 
essential to sustain a trustful and collaborative relationship Since VMI programs may reduce the 
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opportunities for regular communication between distributors and manufacturers (i.e., since 
manufacturers take over the ordering process), it is important that manufacturers find other ways 
to maintain communications. 
Originality/value: This study enhances the literature by showing that there is a dark side to long-
term VMI relationships with respect to supply chain trust. The psychological contract theory has 
been adopted as a lens to explain the dynamics of this relationship. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Vendor-managed inventory (VMI) has become a common supply chain collaboration mechanism. 
VMI service providers (i.e., companies that facilitate VMI relations) have reported strong sales 
growth in recent years. For example, world’s largest cloud based VMI service provider Datalliance 
recently reported 20+ years of consecutive growth (Nasdaq 2017). Moreover, the academic supply 
chain management literature is quite rich in illustrating the benefits of this collaborative buyer-
supplier relationship (Akhbari et al. 2014). VMI has been found to reduce demand uncertainty 
(Waller et al. 1999), minimize information distortion along the supply chain, increase inventory 
turnover and reduce stock-outs in the manufacturer-retailer channel (Chen et al. 2000). The 
upstream firm (for this paper, the manufacturer) benefits from synchronization of inventory and 
transportation decisions through long term commitment from the downstream firm (for this 
research, the distributor) and from increased purchase quantities, while the distributor enjoys 
inventory reduction, fewer stock-outs and cash flow benefits due to decision transfer (Dong et al. 
2014).   
    Supply chain management literature also includes multiple studies of VMI failures (Corbett et 
al. 1999; Sheffi 2002; Sparks and Wagner 2003). VMI has been criticized as harming the long run 
financial performance of manufacturers, and resulting in the loss of purchasing and inventory 
management skills at downstream firms (Pohlen and Goldsby 2003). Some downstream firms have 
discontinued VMI programs due to inaccurate forecasting and to lack of collaboration from their 
manufacturer partners (Sheffi 2002). More recently Handfield (2013), addressing companies 
willing to switch to VMI to reconsider their decisions, proposes “Contrary to what many people 
think, companies like Toyota and Honda have moved away from VMI and simply chose to co-
locate suppliers as close as possible to their facilities”  
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Given inconsistencies in the finding of benefits from VMI relationships, it is important to 
investigate underlying causes for the program’s success or failure. In particular, this research 
postulates that relational factors may be critical to the success of collaborative supply chain 
programs, such as VMI. It has been argued that most enablers or inhibitors of collaborative supply 
chain programs are not technological, but relational in nature (Mentzer et al. 2000).  One of the 
key enablers, as cited in the literature, is trust in the relational partner, which has a significant 
influence on inventory replenishment decisions as well (Hsin-Pin 2016; Darvish et al. 2014). 
Along the same vein, lack of trust has been cited as an inhibitor of these partnerships (Barratt 
2004).  
VMI was first adopted by Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble in the late 1980s and is now 
considered a mature supply chain program.  The technological and relational factors leading to the 
adoption of this supply chain initiative have been investigated thoroughly (Patterson et al. 2003; 
Barratt 2004). However, the impact of the program on the supply chain relationship, itself, has 
been largely unexplored.  Moreover, it is unclear how supply chain relationships may evolve as 
VMI programs mature. Filling this gap, we investigate the impact of VMI implementation on inter-
organizational trust in distributor-manufacturer relationships of different durations. Using cross-
sectional data from 54 VMI-using distributors, and employing multivariate regression and a 3-step 
mediation model, we provide evidence that in longer VMI relationships, distributors experience 
higher levels of psychological contract violation, which, in turn is associated with lower levels of 
distributor trust in the manufacturer. 
     Two significant contributions to the supply chain management literature are drawn from this 
research. First, we illustrate why some of the inconsistencies in the perceived success of VMI 
relationships in the trade and academic literature may have been found. While supporting the 
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extant literature that average trust levels in collaborative supply chain relationships are quite high, 
we also find evidence that long term VMI relationships may be associated with lower supply chain 
trust. Thus, we respond to the call by Villena et al. (2011) for further research on “dark side” of 
highly collaborative supply chain relationships. Second, in examining the cognitive and 
psychological dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships (Hill et al. 2009), we contribute to the 
advancement of the theory of psychological contracts in the supply chain management field, which 
is also a response to calls for more interdisciplinary business research in supply chains (Zacharia 
et al. 2014).  
    In the following section, we synthesize the literature in supply chain trust, VMI, and 
psychological contract theory to provide a theoretical foundation for this research and to develop 
our hypotheses. Next, the research design is presented, followed by the results. Finally, we provide 
a discussion of the findings, as well as limitations and suggestions for future research.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Supply Chain Trust  
Being trustworthy is an ethical and moral duty owed by the trustee to the trustor and to society in 
general (Hosmer 1995). Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712) define trust as, “the willingness of a party to 
be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party.” The authors further note that being vulnerable shows that the trustor has something 
important to lose, and that the trustor takes a risk by making him/herself vulnerable.  
Three main factors have been found to be antecedents of one party’s trust in the other: (i) 
characteristics of the trustee; (ii) the trustor’s propensity to trust others; and (iii) situational factors 
(Mayer et al., 1995). In a supply chain context, Kwon and Suh (2004) investigate the factors 
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affecting the level of trust in buyer-seller relationships and find that relationship-specific asset 
investments and information sharing are positively associated with trust. Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
provide empirical evidence that relational factors, such as shared values and high levels of 
communication between supply chain partners, are likely to increase trust, while opportunistic 
behavior is likely to reduce trust. Doney and Cannon (1997) identify two factors - supplier’s size 
and willingness to customize, as significant drivers of a buyer’s trust in the supplier.  Finally, 
Ganesan (1994) demonstrates that in buyer-supplier relationships, a trustor’s satisfaction with the 
trustee’s performance is a key determinant of trust.  
A major benefit of trustful supply chain relationships is that trust reduces the need to write 
complicated, costly, and difficult to enforce contracts between organizations, thereby lowering 
transaction costs and increasing supply chain performance (Dyer and Chu 2003). Absence of trust 
requires that every contingency be planned in advance and written into a contract; transactions 
have to be scrutinized against opportunistic behavior, all of which increase transaction costs. 
     The level of trust between individuals, groups or parties evolves as relationships mature. The 
literature on evolution of trust in buyer-seller relationships is quite mixed. Social Exchange Theory 
(SET) posits that longer relationships result in higher trust levels, as positive results over time 
increase partner trust (Blau 1964; Dwyer et al. 1987). Along these lines, Gulati and Singh (1998) 
use the prior history of ties as a proxy for inter-organizational trust. Studying collaborative 
planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) projects, Barratt and Oliveira (2001, p. 289) view 
trust as increasing over time and conclude, "a real trust-based relationship will only prevail after a 
relatively lengthy period."  
However, trust does not always evolve along a positive trajectory. In their experimental study 
of trust erosion, Elangovan et al. (2007) observe that violations of the psychological contract 
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between parties hurt trust. They further assert that trustors can forgive up to two trust violations of 
the trustee before erosion sets in, and suggest that the trustee’s inability to perform obligations 
causes less trust erosion than the trustee’s unwillingness to perform.  In other studies, Grayson and 
Ambler (1999) provide empirical evidence that longevity in advertising service relationships is 
negatively related to the buyer’s trust in the service provider, while Moorman et al. (1992), and 
Young-Ybarra and Wiersama (1999) find no link between the length of a relationship and inter-
organizational trust. Overall, while the correlation between relationship maturity and trust is 
uncertain, trust remains an important factor, not only for buyer-supplier relationships, but also as 
a “public good” required for a well-functioning economic system (Hirsch 1978). Next, we discuss 
VMI as an example of highly collaborative supply chain relationships in which trust is a key 
enabler 
2.2 Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) 
Competition and shorter product cycles have pushed companies to evaluate their distribution and 
inventory management systems. Automatic Replenishment Programs (ARP) provide ways for 
firms to reduce safety stock, increase return on assets and reduce obsolete items in warehouses 
(Myers et al. 2001). As a type of ARP, VMI allows upstream firms to manage their inventory at 
the premises of their customers on the basis of shared demand information (Cetinkaya and Lee 
2000).  
Using information technologies as an enabler of supply chain collaboration (Soosay and Hyland, 
2015), VMI can provide many benefits to its users, both upstream and downstream firms. VMI has 
been found to reduce information distortion along the supply chain (Chen et al. 2000), increase 
inventory turnover and reduce stock-outs, improve customer service and reduce costs (Claassen et 
al. 2008). The upstream firm can realize cost savings from VMI by being better able to synchronize 
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production, distribution, and transportation decisions (Dong and Xu 2002).  As a result, an 
upstream firm may realize fewer stock outs, a lower percentage of backorders and increased sales. 
The downstream firm can also realize savings in terms of lower inventory costs and lower 
purchasing expenses, and obtain higher fill rates. Kulp et al. (2004) examine the impact of VMI 
on manufacturer profitability and find that VMI increases manufacturer profit margins. Cachon 
and Fisher (1997) also report that VMI increases inventory performance, but attribute these 
improvements to information sharing through EDI, rather than to the unique aspect of VMI, the 
transfer of inventory control from buyer to supplier. In a manufacturer-distributor supply chain, 
Dong et al. (2014) find that distributors benefit from reduced inventory levels as a result of VMI 
implementation, although this benefit may decline over time. 
     Despite the potential benefits, collaborative supply chain relationships in general, and VMI 
relationships in particular, may fail, especially in the long term. MacDuffie and Helper (2005) 
argue that when parties in a long-term business relationship are very dependent on each other (with 
little threat of exit), they are likely to become both complacent and rigid, with groupthink 
tendencies dominating the relationship. Comparing collaborative business relationships with arms-
length relationships, Wilding and Humphries (2006) introduce the “positive feedback” concept 
and posit that collaborative relationships are more emotional in nature, and small problems in these 
close relationships can be personalized and amplified resulting in serious conflicts, if not properly 
managed. Villena et al. (2011) suggest that building too much social capital in collaborative supply 
chain relationships can bring rigidities and degrade buyer objectivity, eventually hurting supply 
chain performance. Yao et al. (2012) show that as the learning curve flattens out, supply chain 
performance gains from collaborative relationships (i.e. VMI) may erode over time which could 
hurt the longevity of the relationships. 
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     There are a number of reasons why VMI relationships may deteriorate over time. First, 
downstream VMI users have to transfer control of their materials management function to their 
upstream partners. This transfer may cause loss of critical purchasing and inventory management 
skills for the downstream firms, leaving them vulnerable to opportunistic actions by their upstream 
partners (Williams 2000). Second, distributor-buyers must share proprietary data (e.g., inventory 
and sales information) with their manufacturer-suppliers, which may be risky. Manufacturers 
could, for example, leak the demand information to third parties or to the distributors’ competitors 
(Anand and Goyal 2009). Third, lack of equity in sharing VMI benefits may lead to disputes 
between the manufacturer and distributor (Pohlen and Goldsby 2003).  In some cases, major gains 
may be realized by the manufacturer, and not the distributor; for example, through reductions in 
the bullwhip effect contributing to production efficiencies (e.g., Cetinkaya and Lee 2000).  On the 
other hand, distributors may experience significant cost and service gains, but not their upstream 
partners (Roberts 2003). Finally, some VMI relationships may fail due to lack of cooperation.  
Along these lines, Lee (2004, p. 9) report that, “…VMI systems have generated friction, because 
buyers have refused to share costs with the suppliers.” Thus, it would be fair to say that relational 
factors play a key role in VMI failures.  In the next section we discuss psychological contracts that 
help govern VMI relationships. 
2.3 Psychological Contract Theory  
Psychological contracts, as complements to formal contracts, are important aspects of exchange 
relationships. Psychological contracts refer to the reciprocal obligations parties have in 
relationships (Robinson 1996). They do not depend so much on what the other party does in a 
relationship, but how the actions of the other party are perceived. When one party feels that the 
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other has not fulfilled a promise, he/she may suffer a sense of injustice, resentment or betrayal, 
called a “psychological contract violation” (Robinson 1996).  
     There are two main conditions that result in psychological contract violations: reneging and 
incongruence.  Reneging is the unwillingness or inability of a party to fulfill a promise or an 
obligation. Incongruence refers to misperceptions in the understanding of the other party’s 
obligations in a relationship. Incongruence may result when one party believes a promise was 
completely fulfilled, while the other party perceives that it is still unfulfilled. As indicated by 
Klatzky (1980), promises may become distorted in human memory, thus generating incongruence 
over time.  
     Robinson (1996) discusses three main factors leading to incongruence. The first is divergent 
schemata. Parties in a relationship may have different schemata or cognitive frameworks that are 
used to make sense of events. These discrepancies may be due to differences in experiences or to 
differences in underlying organizational cultures. The second factor that may lead to incongruence 
relates to the complexity and ambiguity of the tasks performed by the parties in the relationship. 
Given the bounded cognitive capacity and bounded rationality of human beings, it is highly 
probable that parties will tend to simplify or understate the complexity of tasks, but in different 
ways that can create incongruence.  Furthermore, the parties may interpret and bridge ambiguities 
in distinct ways based on their unique experiences, which can produce incongruence in the 
understanding and assignment of task responsibilities. Finally, the third factor is lack of 
communication between parties. In a rapidly changing business environment, regular 
communication between organizations is required to maintain relationships.  The absence of this 
communication may result in incongruence in perceptions. As Mentzer et al. (2000, p.55) states, 
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“when communication between supply chain partners is nonexistent or inadequate, the potential 
for problems increases exponentially.”   
     Evidence through our industry contacts indicates that many VMI relationships are not governed 
by formal contracts, but by verbal and informal agreements. Waller et al. (1999, p. 27) report that 
in VMI relationships buyers transfer inventory responsibility to the vendors not only by “letters” 
but also by the unwritten “spirit of the agreement”. Given this informal understanding between 
supply chain partners, there may be room for psychological contracts to help govern VMI 
relationships. 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
VMI is a partnership between two firms in a supply chain. As in any other business partnership, a 
degree of trust is essential for the relationship to be maintained (Pohlen and Goldsby 2003). Since 
the implementation of VMI requires the distributor to trust the manufacturer to manage its 
inventory efficiently and equitably, the maintenance and development of trust between partners is 
of utmost importance.  
    However, there are three key aspects of a VMI relationship that could lead to an erosion of trust 
as the relationship matures. First, VMI is a unique collaborative process that requires a distributor 
to transfer inventory decision-making to its manufacturer.  As Yao et al. (2012) state, the 
manufacturer may initially perform this task well, but performance may erode over time, as 
practices become obsolete and as the supplier’s best personnel are transferred to new projects. As 
a result, the distributor’s belief that future performance by the manufacturer will meet expectations 
(i.e., trust in the manufacturer to perform its tasks properly) may be diminished. Second, as 
Williams (2000) has observed, buyers may become increasingly dependent on their suppliers as 
their relationship matures. At the outset of a VMI relationship, the distributor may have personnel 
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with the skills to monitor the manufacturer’s inventory and purchasing decisions (i.e., personnel 
who recently performed these tasks themselves).  However, over time, these individuals will leave 
the organization, move to new positions, or just forget how to perform their previous functions.  
As a result, the distributor’s ability to monitor the manufacturer may diminish over time. Since 
trust is best bred in an environment of mutual dependency (Emerson 1962), the development of a 
one-way dependent relationship could diminish a distributor’s trust in its manufacturer. Actually, 
analyzing the antecedents of supply chain project success, Brinkhoff et al. (2014) provide 
empirical evidence that asymmetric supply chain dependence leads to lower supply chain trust and 
Roldan Bravo et al. (2016) show that power asymmetry in supply chain relationships influences 
innovation and competence. Finally, after implementing VMI, the traditional ordering process 
ceases. This change may result in lower levels of contact and communication between distributor-
manufacturer dyads. As the VMI program matures, personal relationships between buyer and 
supplier staff may be lost.  Hirakubo et al. (2000, p. 90) suggest "direct and frequent contact 
between buyers and suppliers is indispensable for building a trusting relationship." Therefore, 
reduced communication between the distributors and manufacturers could negatively affect trust 
levels. Considering all three attributes of a VMI relationship, we hypothesize the following:   
 H1. Longer VMI relationships are associated with lower levels of distributor trust in    
 the manufacturer.  
 
In addition to contributing to the erosion of trust, long term VMI relationships may also lead 
to psychological contract violation. Mentzer et al. (2000) observe that VMI relationships may 
develop over a long period of time. Given the high rate of employee turnover in many firms, it is 
common for the staff that implemented the VMI program at both the buyer and supplier firms to 
move to new positions. As the functioning of a VMI program often relies on unwritten and 
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informal agreements, changes in personnel may result in the loss of tacit knowledge and the 
disruption of personal relationships. As a VMI relationship matures, conflicts between the 
distributor and manufacturer may more easily develop leading to violations of the psychological 
contract.  
In addition, Mentzer et al. (2000, p. 55) suggest that, “Clear expectations are required in any 
lasting relationship.” Informal VMI relationships make the clarification of responsibilities between 
the two organizations challenging, and these challenges will be compounded as the environment 
changes and the business relationship evolves.  
Moreover, asymmetry in sharing VMI benefits between manufacturers and distributors may 
contribute to psychological contract violation. Nyaga et al. (2010) suggest that perceptual inequity 
in the sharing of benefits from collaborative supply chain relationships could hurt the relationship 
outcomes. Corsten and Kumar (2005) argue that manufacturers often feel greater inequities in the 
sharing of these benefits.  Along the same lines, Roberts (2003) and Lee (2004) assert that 
distributors get the larger share of supply chain benefits from adopting VMI. A perception of 
inequity may cause a manufacturer to renege on the informal agreement surrounding a VMI 
relationship by limiting performance, creating violations in the distributor’s psychological 
contract.  
Mentzer et al. (2000) demonstrate that employee-oriented relational factors compose a 
significant portion of the enablers and inhibitors in VMI relationships. Since relationships may 
deteriorate over time, the maturing of a VMI contract may lead to greater possibilities of 
psychological contract violation.  Thus we have the following hypothesis:  
H2: Longer VMI relationships are associated with higher levels of psychological contract 
violation experienced by distributors.  
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Broken promises erode the perceived benevolence and integrity of the violator and are often 
associated with the violation of psychological contracts. In an organizational context, Robinson 
(1996) demonstrates that an employee’s feelings of psychological contract violation lead to loss 
of trust towards his/her employer.  In a buyer-seller context, Hill et al. (2009) investigate the link 
between psychological contract violation and two dimensions of trust: dependability and 
benevolence. According to the authors, suppliers that experience psychological contract violation 
in their relationship with buyers tend to evaluate the dependability and benevolence of those buyers 
negatively, thereby eroding the perceived trustworthiness of the buyers. Similarly, in a VMI 
context, we expect that a distributor’s feelings of psychological contract violation will lead to loss 
of trust in the manufacturer.  
H3: Higher levels of psychological contract violation experienced by distributors are 
associated with lower levels of distributor trust. 
 
Erosion of trust in a buyer-supplier relationship may take place over time. A distributor that 
observes a partner manufacturer underperform in a relationship may, (i) forgive the manufacturer 
by acknowledging its own limited efforts in the relationship, (ii) forgive the manufacturer by 
considering the hostile environmental factors that could have prevented the manufacturer from 
better fulfilling its performance obligations, or (iii) give signals of frustration, anger and 
disappointment to the manufacturer (Elangovan et al. 2007). Only if the manufacturer does not 
address the distributor’s perception of a contract violation may the distributor adjust downwards 
the level of trust placed on that manufacturer.  Therefore, psychological contract violation may at 
least partially mediate the relationship between length of VMI relationship and trust; that is, it may 
be through psychological contract violation that the length of a VMI relationship will influence 
trust, as stated in the following hypothesis:  
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H4: Psychological contract violation is a mediator between length of VMI relationship and 
distributor trust 
 
Figure 1 provides a visual description of our four hypotheses.  
 
------------------------ 
INSERT  FIGURE 1 
------------------------ 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
Cross-sectional data were collected using a survey format from 200 distributors that have their 
inventories managed by manufacturers through VMI arrangements. Our sample was obtained from 
a leading third party VMI platform service provider that serves thousands of retailer, distributor 
and manufacturer locations with millions of SKUs and billions of dollars in sales orders. All of 
their customers operating as a distributor in North America were included in the sample. Key 
informants are executives/senior managers from unique distributors overseeing these VMI 
relationships. All informants in our sample represent distributors operating in the U.S. (96 percent) 
and Canada (4 percent). Each informant is asked to answer survey questions concerning the 
distributor firm’s relationship with the manufacturer with which the firm has VMI agreement 
(largest one if the firm is supplied by multiple manufacturers). The unit of analysis is, therefore, a 
distributor-manufacturer VMI relationship. Similar to Dyer and Chu (2003) who define trustors 
and trustees in supply chain relationships based on their perceived authority, we consider 
distributors as trustors and manufacturers as trustees, since the distributors are made vulnerable to 
the actions of their manufacturers under VMI.  
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     In all of the VMI arrangements, regular communications between the distributor and the 
manufacturer occur through electronic data interchange (EDI). The third party VMI services 
provider facilitates the EDI arrangements. Daily, the distributors share item-level point-of-sales 
data and inventory levels with their manufacturer-suppliers using the Product Activity Data 
document (EDI 852). The manufacturers replenish the distributor inventories based on these data. 
Despite its critical role, the information services provider does not intervene in VMI management 
decisions (i.e., inventory levels and order decisions), but only provides the technical expertise to 
allow communications to take place between the two parties. In addition, the information services 
provider holds annual conferences for its manufacturer and distributor customers to facilitate the 
sharing of best practices. None of the distributors are subsidiaries of the manufacturers; all are 
independent entities that own the inventories at their premises (i.e., consignment is not used).  
     The survey was designed primarily by using tested measures from previous studies. Survey 
items measuring a single construct were grouped together in the questionnaire with each section 
starting with a brief description of its content.  The survey was pre-tested by both researchers and 
industry professionals. An early draft was reviewed by three logistics and supply chain researchers 
for content, clarity, flow and coherence. The survey was then sent to two industry professionals 
and was pre-tested, resulting in further improvements. The final survey has a total of 32 questions, 
well below 125 - the upper threshold suggested by Dillman (1978) to achieve a good response rate. 
A pre-notification email was sent by our sponsor to the distributors before the survey was 
launched in order to encourage their participation. A week after the pre-notification letter, a link 
to the survey was emailed to each distributor. This first email was followed by two subsequent 
communications separated by a week. To encourage responses, the invitation emails were always 
sent on Tuesdays (to avoid busy Mondays after the weekend) at 10:00 AM (after the early morning 
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email traffic). In addition, an offer was made to potential informants to donate $2 to the National 
Wildlife Federation for the return of a completed survey. The first communication wave produced 
38 responses, the second wave 17 responses, and the third wave 2 responses, for a total of 57.  
    Following the recommendation of Kumar et al. (1993), the key informants to our survey are 
senior managers/executives working for the distributor; individuals who are in charge of 
overseeing the day-to-day VMI relationship with the manufacturer. The profiles of the key 
informants to our survey are illustrated in Table-1. Thirty nine percent of the respondents hold 
positions at the director level or higher, including Director of Purchasing, Vice President of 
Operations, and Director of Supply Chain Management. Forty-three percent occupy managerial 
roles, such as Procurement Manager, Alliance Manager and IT Manager. The remaining 18 percent 
of the respondents are specialists, such as IT Analysts and EDI Administrators.  
------------------------ 
INSERT  TABLE 1 
------------------------ 
    We also asked our key informants about the length of their employment with the distributor 
firm. 65 percent were employed for 7 years or more, 7 percent for 5-6 years, 16 percent for 3-4 
years and 9 percent for 1-2 years. Only 3 percent of our respondents have been working for the 
distributor firm for less than a year. Thus, based on the profiles of our key respondents and the 
length of their employment with the distributor firm, we are confident that our key respondents are 
competent and knowledgeable to complete our survey. 
     Finally, we provide information about the profiles of distributors in our sample. Table 2 shows 
that majority of the distributors are small to medium-sized enterprises representing a range of 
industries including Electrical Supplies, Auto Parts and Supplies, Plumbing, and Consumer Goods. 
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------------------------ 
INSERT  TABLE 2 
------------------------ 
    Out of the 200 distributors we contacted, 5 had opted out of the online survey system that was 
employed and, therefore, could not be surveyed, 4 answered that they did not use VMI anymore, 
and 29 email addresses bounced back. Of the remaining 162 distributors, 57 completed the survey. 
Three responses were further deleted because respondents either mentioned that they were not 
familiar enough with the VMI relationship to complete the survey or left many questions 
unanswered. Eventually, we had 54 usable responses and a response rate of 33.3 percent. Although 
the reasonably high response rate could alleviate some concerns, we tested for non-response bias 
by comparing the early and late waves of the completed questionnaires based on the suggestion of 
Armstrong and Overton (1977) that late responses proxy for non-respondents. Sorting the 
questionnaire by completion date, a subset of 21 responses completed on the first day were tagged 
as “early”. This was compared with the late wave - another subset of 21 which were received the 
latest, between days 6 and 15 after emailing the survey. The t-test did not yield any significant 
difference between early and late respondents for three key variables: Trust (t=-0.44), Length of 
VMI relationship (t=-0.69) and Number of employees (t=0.66), thus lending support to the absence 
of non-response bias in our survey. 
    Given all questions were answered by only one key respondent from each distributor, it is 
important to address potential common method bias concerns. In order to reduce the potential for 
common method bias, in designing the survey, we did the following: (i) included a variable for 
propensity-to-trust (PTT) in our model to control for potential respondent biases, as per Podsakoff 
et al. (2003, p. 889)’s suggestion to “use a measure of the assumed source of the method variance 
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as a covariate in the statistical analysis”; and (ii) used reverse-coded items in three of the constructs 
to alleviate potential response pattern biases. At the statistical analysis phase, we used Harmon’s 
single-factor test to conduct an exploratory factor analysis using all items in our study (Aulakh and 
Gencturk 2000). We found that four different factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one, 
and these four factors together accounted for 78.1 percent of the variance. Because, neither a single 
factor emerged, nor a single variable accounted for majority of the covariance among items 
(Podsakoff and Organ 1986), we conclude that common method variance is not a significant issue 
for our study.  
3.2 Measures 
The measures have been adapted from the extant trust and supply chain literatures. In order to 
capture the VMI context of this study, minor modifications have been made to some items based 
on feedback from industry professionals. While a majority of our survey questions use a five-point 
Likert scale (1: Strongly disagree; 5: Strongly agree), a few questions have open-ended (i.e. “What 
position do you hold in your firm”) and Yes/No (i.e. “Is your firm an independent distributor”) 
type of answers as well.   
     Our dependent variable, TRUST, captures a distributor’s trust in its largest VMI manufacturer.  
Three dimensions of trust related to the distributor’s perception of the manufacturer – benevolence, 
integrity, and ability to perform, are assessed using a total of six items. Two items measuring the 
perceived benevolence of the manufacturer are adapted from Dyer and Chu (2003) and Doney and 
Cannon (1997). Perceived integrity of the manufacturer is measured by two items adapted from 
Zaheer et al. (1998) and Dyer and Chu (2000). Perceived ability of the manufacturer is measured 
by the competence scale from Yilmaz et al. (2005). Finally, as a reliability check on the Trust 
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construct, as suggested by Dyer and Chu (2000), we include an item assessing the "manufacturer's 
reputation for trustworthiness". 
    The key independent variable in our model, LENGTH_VMI, assesses the length of the VMI 
relationship between the distributor and the manufacturer and is measured by a direct question in 
the survey: “How long has your firm been using VMI with this supplier? (Round to the nearest 
year)” Five choices include “Less than a year”, “1-2 years”, “3-4 years”, “5-6 years” and “7 years 
or more”.  
     The mediating variable in our model is PCV (Psychological Contract Violation). This variable 
captures the degree of psychological contract violation experienced by a distributor in its VMI 
relationship with the manufacturer and the items in this construct are adapted from Hill et al. 
(2009) with minor changes to fit the VMI context.  
     We include five control variables to increase the reliability of our results. PTT, or Propensity-
to-Trust, is adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999).  It is included in the model for two reasons: (i) 
to better ensure that the key informant’s inherent trust propensity does not confound our results; 
and, (ii) to control for potential common method bias created by the key informant’s affective 
states. SIZE of the distributor is included to control for unobservable distributor heterogeneity that 
may be correlated with the independent variable, or influence the mediating or dependent variable. 
Two items are used to assess size – number of employees at the distributor and total revenue of 
the distributor in the most recent year. A variable assessing supply chain performance 
improvement– PERFORMANCE - is included in our model since performance may be a significant 
predictor of trust.  It is measured by three items: (i) the reduction in inventory related costs; (ii) 
increase in inventory turnover; and, (iii) improved fill rate - after implementing VMI. Finally, we 
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include two dummy variables – Industry Auto and Industry Electrical, to control for unobservable 
industry effects.  The other industries serve as the base case. 
    Descriptive statistics for the key variables are provided in Table 3. The TRUST construct has a 
mean score of 4.09. Given that the item scores range from "lowest trust: 1" to "highest trust: 5" on 
a 5 point Likert scale, it is evident that the average trust level that distributors have in their 
manufacturers is quite high. The PCV construct has a mean of 1.66 showing that perceived 
psychological contract violation among distributors is relatively low, but the standard deviation of 
0.55 indicates that there is a significant amount of variation in PCV among distributors. The PTT 
variable has a mean of 3.18, implying the average key informant’s inherent disposition to trust is 
moderate. In other words, our key informants neither blindly trust, nor suspect every action, of 
their partners. The PERFOMANCE variable has a mean of 3.64 out of 5.00 which points to 
reasonable satisfaction about performance improvement after adoption of VMI. The SIZE 
construct has a mean of 3.61, indicating that our dataset is comprised of small-to-medium sized 
firms as previously discussed in section 3.1. The independent variable LENGTH_VMI has a mean 
of 3.91 years and a standard deviation of 2.56, which indicates the presence of firms with a diverse 
set of new and mature VMI relationships. Finally, the two industry dummies (Industry Auto and 
Industry Electrical) show that 45 percent of the respondent distributors are in the electrical supplies 
industry while 35 percent come from the automotive parts and supplies industry, and the remaining 
20 percent comprise the base category of other sectors (Consumer Goods, Plumbing, Industrial 
Products and Utility). 
------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 
------------------------ 
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3.3 Measure validation 
We conduct Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to check the internal consistency of the factors. 
Although model fit statistics are very sensitive to sample size (Gerbing and Anderson 1985), our 
model provides a reasonable fit for the survey data: Chi-Square = 232.12, d.f. = 142, P = 0.01, CFI 
= 0.90, RMSEA = 0.10 (Bogozzi and Yi 1988; Hu and Bentler 1999). In addition, as shown in 
Table 4, all item loadings onto the respective constructs are highly significant and above the 0.6 
threshold (Nunnaly, 1978), except for the second item of the TRUST construct that had a 0.59 
coefficient. As this particular item was previously tested in the seminal work of Dyer and Chu 
(2003), we have kept it in the model. The inter-factor correlations provided in Table 5 are all below 
the 0.85 threshold1 (Brown, 2006) and the pairwise correlation between items of different 
constructs are all below 0.6, extending further support to the discriminant validity of our 
constructs. 
------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 4  
INSERT TABLE 5 
------------------------ 
4. RESULTS  
4.1 Overview 
Before formally testing our hypotheses, we provide summary statistics of the distributor trust 
levels over three phases of VMI relationships. The average trust level of distributors that have been 
using VMI for less than a year is 0.47 standard deviations above the mean trust level for all 
distributors in our sample. For distributors that have been using VMI between one and seven years, 
                                               
1 VIF analysis results range between 1.20 and 2.67 (all below the threshold of 10) with a mean of 1.78 indicating 
that multi-collinearity among the predictors in our models is not a serious issue. 
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the trust level is only 0.11 standard deviations above the mean. Finally, for distributors which have 
been using VMI for at least seven years, the trust level is 0.74 standard deviations below the mean. 
The difference of the mean trust levels between new (<= one year) and mature (>= seven years) 
VMI relationships is statistically significant (p= 0.003). 
4.2 Estimation Results 
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to analyze the survey data, following two similar 
studies by Hill et al. (2009) and Villena et al. (2011). Results are presented in Table 6.  
    In column 1, the dependent variable TRUST is regressed solely onto the independent variable 
LENGTH_VMI and coefficient of -0.36** shows that there is a significant negative relationship 
between the length of a VMI relationship and distributor trust in the manufacturer. With an R2 
value of 0.11, length of a VMI relationship explains around 11 percent of the variability in TRUST. 
In column 2, TRUST is regressed onto the control variables in the absence of LENGTH_VMI. 
While the coefficients of this model are not among our primary interests, an R2 value of 0.24 
indicates that the control variables explain a significant portion of the variability in the dependent 
variable TRUST and merit inclusion in the model. Merging the independent and control variables 
in a single model, we observe again in column 3 that LENGTH_VMI is negatively associated with 
TRUST (coefficient of -0.32**). This provides support for our Hypothesis-1 that longer VMI 
relationships are associated with lower distributor trust in the manufacturer. The results show that 
for a distributor at the sample's mean trust level (4.09 out of 5.00), all else equal, a year increase 
in the length of the VMI relationship results in a 1.31 percent reduction2 in distributor's trust of its 
VMI manufacturer. 
                                               
2 The coefficient -0.32 divided by the mean value of the TRUST construct 24.52. (Mean value is unnormalized 
average of the construct which is made up of 6 items) 
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    In columns 4-6, we report the results when PCV is the dependent variable. Similar to our 
approach above, we regress PCV onto LENGTH_VMI in column 4 and see that there is a significant 
positive relationship (coefficient of 0.45***) and a R2 value of 0.17. In column 5, we regress PCV 
only onto the control variables and observe that the control variables explain 22 percent of the 
variability in PCV. Finally, we put all variables in a single model and report the results in column 
6. The coefficient of the independent variable LENGTH_VMI slightly increases to 0.46***. 
Overall, we observe that longer VMI relationships are associated with higher levels of 
psychological contract violation which offers support to Hypothesis 2. 
    In column 7, we regress the dependent variable onto the independent variable LENGTH_VMI, 
mediating variable PCV and all control variables. The PCV variable has a significant and negative 
coefficient of -0.47*** indicating that higher psychological contract violation is associated with 
lower levels of distributor trust in the manufacturer, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
    To test the fourth hypothesis, we follow Baron and Kenny (1986) approach of three-step 
mediation model. Mediation is demonstrated if the inclusion of PCV in the estimation of TRUST 
in column 7 (i) reduces the significance of the LENGTH_VMI to TRUST relationship reported in 
column 3, and (ii) results in a significant coefficient for the newly added PCV variable in column 
7.  We observe that the mediating variable PCV has a significant effect (-0.47***) on the dependent 
variable TRUST, while the coefficient for LENGTH_VMI (-0.10) turns to be insignificant (p > 
0.10) in column 7. As a result, the relationship between LENGTH_VMI and TRUST can be said to 
be fully mediated by PCV, supporting Hypothesis 4. 
------------------------ 
INSERT  TABLE 6 
------------------------ 
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     Interpreting the control variables, we see from the results in columns 3 and 7 that higher 
propensity to trust (PTT) is associated with higher levels of trust (coefficients of 0.59** and 
0.51**). This result is to be expected as theory shows that propensity to trust is a major driver of 
the trustor’s level of trust (Mayer et al., 1995). Interestingly, improvements in performance 
(PERFORMANCE) contribute to significant reductions in psychological contract violation 
(column 6) but have no direct impact on the level of trust. Finally, we observe that distributor SIZE 
has no significant association with either PCV or TRUST and that industry sector is not a significant 
factor either. 
5. DISCUSSION 
This study enhances the literature by showing that there is a dark side to long-term VMI 
relationships with respect to supply chain trust. Previously, Villena et al. (2011) showed the dark 
side of highly collaborative buyer-supplier relationships such that too much social capital could 
decrease a buyer’s objectivity and increase a supplier’s opportunistic behavior – thus hurting 
supply chain performance. In this study, we demonstrate another dark side of highly collaborative 
supply chain relationships in a VMI context: longer VMI relationships are associated with higher 
levels of psychological contract violation, which in turn leads to lower levels of distributor trust.  
     For our research, we adopted the psychological contract theory as a lens to explain the dynamics 
of this relationship, similar to Hill et al. (2009), who used the same theory to explain the 
relationship between unethical activities and supply chain trust. The common use of informal VMI 
agreements between manufacturers and distributors allows psychological contracts to form in this 
supply chain relationship. This development, coupled with the idiosyncratic attributes of VMI 
(notably, the relinquishment of control over inventory and purchasing decisions by the distributor 
to the manufacturer, the potential loss of distributor competencies, and the unequal sharing of costs 
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and benefits), may be the factors that increase the distributors’ experience of psychological 
contract violation in long-term VMI relationships, in turn resulting in lower trust levels on the 
distributor side.  
    A primary reason for manufacturers to participate in VMI programs is to retain customers. This 
requires the manufacturers to nurture trustful relationships with their distributors. The bad news 
for manufacturers using VMI is that after implementing VMI, distributor trust is subject to erosion 
over time.  Psychological contract violation, which is strongly related to supply chain trust, comes 
with feelings of anger, resentment, injustice and even betrayal on the distributor side. 
Manufacturers that meet regularly with their distributors at multiple levels should be able to 
observe these signals of frustration, and act on them to prevent the loss of trust. Elangovan et al. 
(2007) suggest that “post-violation analysis” could reduce the extent of the damage in the case of 
a trust violation. Therefore, listening to their distributor-customers and jointly bridging gaps in the 
understanding of reciprocal obligations from a VMI program could help manufacturers avoid trust 
erosion. In addition, Elangovan et al. (2007) show that the extent of trust erosion is higher if the 
distributor believes that a manufacturer is not willing to perform duties (rather than not being able 
to perform the duties). Manufacturers should clarify reasons for failing to meet the expectations of 
the distributors and underline the external disturbances preventing them from fulfilling these 
duties, whenever possible.   
     Our findings have important implications for VMI users. First, manufacturers should not let the 
implementation of VMI restrict communications with their distributors. Reciprocal inter-
organizational communication is essential to sustain a trustful and collaborative relationship 
(Bstieler et al., 2017). As discussed above, lack of communication is an important factor in 
generating incongruence between supply chain partners. Since VMI programs may reduce the 
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opportunities for regular communication between distributors and manufacturers (i.e., since 
manufacturers take over the ordering process), it is important that manufacturers find other ways 
to maintain communications. Therefore, the implementation of regular meetings with distributors, 
along with other forums for communication, such as industry-wide VMI conferences, could also 
be helpful in maintaining a trusting relationship. It may also be helpful for VMI partners to rely 
more heavily on written contracts in governing their relationships to limit the extent to which the 
relationships are ruled by psychological contracts. Third party VMI technology providers could be 
instrumental in facilitating formalized VMI contracts between manufacturers and distributors. 
Finally, in supply chain relationships, trust may play a larger role in the satisfaction and 
commitment of buyers than suppliers, given the dependency that buyers have on suppliers (Nyaga 
et al. 2010). Therefore, it is incumbent on manufacturers to continuously strive to build and 
maintain a trusting, cooperative relationship in their VMI partnerships with distributors. 
    Finally, this paper contributes to the supply chain management literature in the area of 
collaborative supply chain relationships. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
investigate how the duration of a VMI relationship impacts supply chain trust. Moreover, we make 
a theoretical contribution by showing the mediating role of psychological contract violation 
between length of a VMI relationship and supply chain trust. Given the need for interdisciplinary 
research in supply chain management (Zacharia et al. 2014), our study is an initial effort to 
investigate cognitive and psychological aspects of buyer-supplier relationships.  
6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our analysis of distributor trust levels must be interpreted in the light of VMI relationship survival 
bias. We have surveyed only those distributors that have maintained VMI relationships with their 
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manufacturers.  However, some VMI relationships could have been terminated due to lack of trust. 
The exclusion of these failed VMI relationships could bias our results. 
     Trust goes both ways in supply chain relationships and investigation of how the manufacturers’ 
(upstream party) trust level changes as a VMI relationship matures merits researchers’ attention as 
well. The cross-sectional nature of the data only allows us to confirm associative relationships 
between the variables. In the future, it will be helpful to validate the causal links using longitudinal 
data. Future research could employ time series data to track VMI relationships as they progress in 
order to determine how trust may erode over time. Surveying manufacturers to investigate their 
perspective on relational factors in VMI relationships would be an important enhancement to our 
study as well.  
We have proposed that long-term VMI relationships are subject to lower distributor trust 
because of idiosyncratic attributes of VMI. However, we do not make generalizations from this 
conclusion to all buyer-supplier relationships (including those not using VMI). In the future, our 
model could be tested on users of other collaborative programs to determine whether inter-
organizational trust evolves differently under non-VMI relationships. Finally, upon collection of a 
larger set of observations, structural equation modeling could be used to model the relationship 
between our multiple constructs in a single model in order to better account for error variance and 
intricate relationships. 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
Trust is important for survival and development of supply chain relationships as it leads to 
commitment and satisfaction. Our findings shed light on a dark side of VMI relationships, such 
that long-term VMI relationships are associated with lower levels of distributor trust in the 
manufacturer. Manufacturers that use VMI to replenish their distributors’ inventories should 
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ensure that adoption of VMI does not decrease communication with distributors. Bilateral 
communication with distributors could help manufacturers ensure that any violation of the 
psychological contract with a distributor is realized before it breaks down a trusting relationship. 
Both the distributors and manufacturers should be explicit and clear in designing the terms of their 
VMI relationship, and if possible use a formal contract to limit the potential of psychological 
contract violation. Grayson and Ambler (1999, p.139) conclude "If the sustainable competitive 
advantage enjoyed by long-term relationships carries the seeds of its own destruction, then it is 
important to understand why, so that managerial strategies can be developed specifically to fend 
off this policy."  We agree.  It is incumbent on manufacturers and their distributors to act in ways 
that maintain a trusting relationship for the good of both parties. 
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Table 1: Profile of Key Informants 
Key Informant's 
Position Held in the Distributor Firm Frequency  Percent 
   Director / CEO / President / Vice President 21  39% 
   Manager / Department Head 23  43% 
   Analyst / Specialist  10  18% 
Duration of Employment with the Distributor Firm   
   Less than a year 1 2% 
   1-2 years 4 7% 
   3-4 years 8 15% 
   5-6 years 4 7% 
   7 years or more 37 69% 
Total 54 100% 
 
Table 2: Profile of Distributors 
 Frequency Percent 
Number of Employees   
   Fewer than 50 7 13% 
   51-200 20 37% 
   201-500 18 33% 
   501-1000 3 6% 
   1001 or more 6 11% 
Total Revenue Last Year (Million Dollars)   
   Less than 1 2 4% 
   1-4.99 0 0% 
   5-19.99 12 22% 
   20-49.99 14 26% 
   More than 50 26 48% 
Industry    
   Electrical 26 48% 
   Auto 19 35% 
   Plumbing 6 11% 
   Consumer Goods 2 4% 
   Industrial Products 1 2% 
Length of the VMI Relationship   
   Less than a year 9 17% 
   1-2 years 8 15% 
   3-4 years 17 31% 
   5-6 years 10 19% 
   7 years or more 10 19% 
   
Total 54 100% 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
TRUST*  4.09 0.47 2.5 5.0 
PCV* 1.66 0.55 1.0 3.0 
PTT*  3.18 0.52 2.0 4.0 
PERFORMANCE*  3.62 0.72 2.0 5.0 
SIZE* 3.61 1.02 1.5 5.0 
LENGTH_VMI 3.91 2.56 0.5 8.0 
Industry Auto DUMMY 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Industry Electrical DUMMY 0.45 0.50 0 1 
* Item sums in these constructs have been normalized to 5 points scale in calculating descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 4: Item Loadings on the Factors 
Responses are on a 5 point Likert Scale:                                                 
1 = Strongly disagree,    3= Not sure,     5 = Strongly agree   
Standardized 
loading 
Standard 
error 
t-Value 
TRUST       
    When making important decisions, this supplier considers our firm’s 
welfare as well as its own.  
0.69 0.09 6.97 
    Based on past experience, we can rely on this supplier to keep 
promises made to our firm. 
0.87 0.03 26.07 
    If given a chance, this supplier could take unfair advantage in our                   
business relationship. (R) 
-0.59 0.09 6.11 
    We receive fair treatment from this supplier.  0.79 0.05 15.94 
    This supplier is competent and capable of providing us with required 
products according to our specifications in a timely fashion.  
0.61 0.14 4.50 
   This supplier has a reputation for trustworthiness in the business 
world.  
0.80 0.05 16.23 
 
PERFORMANCE  
   
    Use of VMI has improved our fill rate to our customers 0.87 0.05 17.67 
    Use of VMI has allowed us to reduce our inventory related costs  0.91 0.03 34.64 
    Use of VMI has increased our inventory turnover 0.91 0.03 32.67 
 
PCV:   
   When I think about what our firm contributed to the relationship with 
this supplier and what we received in return, I feel  
   
    pleased  (R) -0.89 0.03 35.43 
    angry 0.88 0.05 18.77 
    frustrated 0.92 0.01 99.81 
    satisfied  (R) -0.80 0.04 20.59 
    cheated 0.79 0.03 26.91 
 
PROPENSITY TO TRUST (PTT)  
   
    Most business partners can be counted on to do what they say they 
will do.   
0.62 0.16 3.79 
    These days, our business should be alert; otherwise some other             
firms are likely to take advantage of us.  (R) 
-0.66 0.16 3.99 
    In dealing with our suppliers and customers, each and every aspect 
of the relationship should be written in a contract to prevent 
opportunistic behavior. (R) 
-0.68 0.15 4.64 
   * Items marked (R) are reverse coded 
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Table 5: Discriminant Validity  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 TRUST 1      
2 LENGTH_VMI -0.33 1     
3 PERFORMANCE 0.22 0.13 1    
4 PCV -0.59 0.42 -0.32 1   
5 PTT 0.43 -0.24 0.02 -0.22 1  
6 SIZE 0.23 0.16 0.37 -0.21 0.22 1 
 
 
 
Table 6: OLS Results 
Dependent Variable 
(Column #) 
  TRUST 
(1) 
TRUST 
(2) 
TRUST 
(3) 
PCV 
(4) 
PCV 
(5) 
PCV 
(6) 
TRUST 
(7) 
LENGTH_VMI     -0.36** 
(0.14) 
-    -0.32** 
(0.14) 
    0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-     0.46*** 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
SIZE - 0.10 
(0.24) 
0.20 
(0.23) 
- 0.01 
(0.25) 
-0.15 
(0.23) 
0.13 
(0.22) 
PERFORMANCE - 0.22 
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
-  -0.34* 
(0.18) 
   -0.38** 
(0.16) 
0.07 
(0.16) 
PTT -    0.75** 
 (0.23) 
   0.59** 
(0.23) 
-  -0.42* 
(0.23) 
-0.18 
(0.22) 
    0.51** 
(0.21) 
Industry Auto  - -0.59 
(1.14) 
-0.12 
(1.12) 
- 1.91 
(1.16) 
1.23 
(1.07) 
0.46 
(1.03) 
Industry Electrical  - -0.73 
(0.95) 
-0.33 
(0.93) 
-  1.73* 
(0.96) 
1.15 
(0.88) 
0.21 
(0.86) 
PCV  - - - - - -     -0.47*** 
(0.14) 
CONSTANT      25.91*** 
(0.67) 
    14.79*** 
(3.14) 
   16.13*** 
(3.07) 
     6.55*** 
(0.63) 
    14.50*** 
(3.16) 
   12.52*** 
(2.91) 
    22.05*** 
(3.29) 
R2 0.11 0.24 0.32 0.17 0.22 0.38 0.45 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.30 0.37 
Number of 
observations 
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Significance levels:  * p< 10 %,                       ** p < 5 %,                        *** p < 1% 
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Figure 1: The Research Framework 
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